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Sammendrag 
Ifølge tradisjonell økonomisk teori om sparing (livsløpshypotesen) forventer en at en krones økning i 
pensjonsrettigheter skal føre til en like stor reduksjon i privat sparing. I empiriske analyser av dette 
fenomenet finner en imidlertid ofte en mye mindre effekt. Vi prøver å forklare forskjellen ved hjelp en 
utvidet livsløpsmodell, hvor vi inkluderer effektene av usikkerhet i inntekt og levetid, imperfeksjoner i 
kapitalmarkedet og at individet kan ha ønsker om å etterlate seg arv. Analysen viser at ved å inkludere 
disse faktorene, kan en forklare det meste av avviket mellom empiriske funn og teoretisk prediksjon 
ifølge den tradisjonelle livsløpsmodellen. 
1 Introduction
The impact of public pension scheme on private savings is an important issue in the dis-
cussion of pension reforms. While acknowledging the fact that the main objective of the
public pension system is to provide nancial security for the elderly through the retirement
period, economists and policy makers are also worried that the public pension systems have
contributed to reduce savings in the economy and thus hinder future economic growth, es-
pecially in the light of the ageing problem in many developed economies. Policies aiming to
promote private savings for retirement are implemented or planned in many countries. One
popular proposal is to supplement or replace the unfunded dened benet system by funded
dened contribution system or tax-favored savings account, which explicitly or implicitly
reduces the generosity of the pension system and make the potential retirees more exposed
to investment risks. Many argue that this will not only induce higher private savings but
also lower the nancial burdens of the public pension system. However, how individuals
will respond to these reforms is still an open question. There is always a danger that such a
reform will undermine the nancial security of some retirees, since they may fail to adjust
their behavior in response to the new pension system.
The life cycle hypothesis of consumption plays a crucial role in the discussion of pen-
sion design, since it serves as the main workhorse for understanding the consumption and
savings behavior, see for example Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1995), Blanchard and Frischer
(1989) and Lindbeck and Persson (2003). In the simplest life cycle model, it is assumed that
market is complete and individuals save only to smooth their consumptions over life cycle.
Consumption is simply a function of life time wealth. It does not matter whether the income
is in terms of wage or pension. When an increase in the future pension benet is nanced
by increased taxes on wages and does not change the life time wealth, the increased pension
wealth will be completely o¤set by a reduction of private savings. This feature is typically
labeled as "the perfect o¤set1" and has strong implications for pension system designs. How-
ever, this complete market life cycle model rests on very strong assumptions. First, income
and mortality risk are ignored. When there are uninsurable risks, risk averse individuals will
save more to prepare for future unlucky periods. This leads to the so called "precautionary
saving motive". Skinner (1987) argued that precautionary savings against uncertain income
comprise a large fraction of aggregate savings. We know that if individuals save also for
reasons other than retirement, the degree of substitutability between pension wealth and
private savings will be a¤ected, which will change the o¤set e¤ects. Furthermore, capital
market is assumed to be perfect and there is no credit rationing. In reality, physical collat-
eral such as private housing is typically required for large loans, while unsecured loans are
typically bearing very high interest rate. On the other hand, public pensions are annuities
1In the case when changes in pension wealth imply also changes in life time wealth, there will not be one
to one relationship between pension wealth and private savings even under the complete market life cycle
model. We follow Gale (1998) and apply a bias correct parameter for these cases. See section 5 for detail.
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which can not be withdrawn before retirement. For low income households whose borrowing
constraints are binding, an increase of pension wealth may have no e¤ect on savings. Finally,
other important variables which may inuence individualssavings behavior, such as labor
supply behaviors and factor prices are assumed to be exogenous and xed. However, these
factors may respond to changes in pension wealth and lead to additional impact on savings.
For example, individuals may adjust the timing of their withdrawal from labor market as
results of changes in pension wealth, which leads to the so called "induced retirement e¤ect"
and complicates the connection between pension wealth and private savings.
Given these theoretical ambiguities, considerable e¤orts have been used to empirically
determine the e¤ect of pension wealth on saving. However, the quantitative results di¤er
widely in the literature. Among the earliest works on the e¤ect of pensions on other savings,
Cagan (1965) and Katona (1965) obtained a positive e¤ect of pension wealth on other
saving; Feldstein (1974), Feldstein (1982) and Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) found that
social security wealth crowded out other wealth substantially; and Boyle and Murray (1979)
found that public pension plans had no visible e¤ect on household savings behavior, using
Canadian data. In recent studies, Euwals (2000) found an ambiguous impact of the public
part of the Dutch pension system on savings, but a negative impact of occupational pensions.
Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) found evidence that saving rates increased as a result of a
reduction in pension wealth by exploiting the Italian pension reform of 1992. The diversity
of the results may be a result of a diversity in actual pension system and underlying social
economic factors such as individual attitude towards savings and demographic circumstances
across di¤erent countries or di¤erent time. More importantly, the identication strategies
which di¤er in empirical studies contribute strongly to this. In fact, there are still many
challenges remaining in the empirical analysis of o¤set e¤ect, see for example discussion
in CBO (1998). The main results in the literature point to an o¤set e¤ect which is much
smaller than 1, typically in the range of 20-60%.
As discussed earlier, many factors can explain the gap between the empirical ndings and
the prediction from the simple complete market life cycle model. However, the quantitive
contributions and relative importance of these factors have not yet been studied in the liter-
ature. From a policy point of view, with this type of knowledge specic measures can then
be taken to increase e¤ectiveness and reduce the undesirable side e¤ect of pension policy
changes. In this paper, we build up and calibrate an extended stochastic dynamic model of
household savings behavior which accounts for bequest motive, liquidity constraints, mor-
tality risk and income risk. Extending the complete market life cycle model is certainly not
new. Earlier contributions include Yaari (1965), Skinner (1985) on mortality risk, Deaton
(1991) on liquidity constraints. Zeldes (1989) and Carroll (1992,1997) look at the level of
consumption and saving when labor income is risky and there is imperfect insurance. More
recently, Rodepeter and Winter (1998), Domeij and Klein (2002) and Love (2006) combine
these features together and extend the basic life cycle model further to investigate optimal
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household savings path.
What is new in this paper is to use this type of model to look at how di¤erent risks/constraints
inuence the o¤set e¤ect between pension wealth and non pension wealth. Based on the cal-
ibrated model, simulations are performed to explore consequences of introducing di¤erent
factors. The existence of precautionary savings motive, due to for example income risks, is
typically considered to be one of the main factors which leads to a lower o¤set e¤ect, since
the public pension is no longer a perfect substitute of the private savings. However, our
results shows the opposite: households who face income risk would actually reduce more pri-
vate savings than those who do not, if both experience the same increase in pension wealth.
The reason is that pension wealth is considered to be a much less risky income source. An
increase in pension wealth, will lower overall income risk and thus increase consumption for
those with higher initial income risks. This pattern is illustrated by both a simple analytical
example and more sophisticated simulations. We also nd the inuence of income risk is very
small given our model estimates. Mortality risk works in the opposite direction as income
risk. All else being equal, households facing mortality risks reduce less private savings in
the presense of a pension wealth increase. Thus, we cannot say in general that the existence
of precautionary savings will increase or dampen the o¤set e¤ects between pension wealth
and private savings. The other two factors: borrowing constraint and bequest motive have
a similar e¤ect as the mortality risk has. That is, both will dampen the o¤set e¤ect. When
all these factors are considered, middle aged households (45 to 50 year olds) reduce their
private savings by around 45% of the increased pension wealth. Our exercise shows that it
is important to take these factors into account when we investigate the o¤set e¤ect between
the pension wealth and private wealth, and eventually study the e¤ect of pension system
to savings. Although the extended model still cannot explain fully the departure between
empirical ndings documented Hernæs and Zhu (2007) (23% for middle education level) and
Jia and Zhu (2009b) (35% for middle education level with nancial wealth at the median.),
it shows that by simply accounting for these risks and constraints, we can explain most of
the departure between empirical ndings and theoretical prediction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an analytical illustration
for o¤set e¤ect under income risk only. Section 3 presents our extended dynamic model of
household savings behavior. The model is calibrated in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our
denition of o¤set e¤ect, and analyzes the simulation results. The nal section concludes.
2 O¤set e¤ect under income risk: an analytical illus-
tration
We start our discussion with a simple analytical example to show the possible e¤ects of
precautionary saving motive on the o¤set e¤ect of pension wealth on private savings.
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Suppose in an economy, one agent lives for three periods. He works in the rst two
periods and receives wage income yt, t = 1; 2. The wage income yt is random, and is
realized at the beginning of each period. The individual retires at the end of period 2 and
gets pension income p in period 3, which is a function of life time earnings p = f(y1 + y2):
There is only one risk free asset available in the market with real rate of return r. We
assume that the period utility is u(ct) = log(ct); where ct is consumption at time t. At any
given time t, The individual maximizes the remaining life time utility
P
st u(cs)(1 + )
t s,
subject to the budget constraints. There is no bequest motivated savings in this model.
The model can be solved with backward induction as follows:
When t = 3, the agents value function is:
V3(a3; p) = max
c3
flog(c3)g
subject to : c3 = (1 + r)a3 + p; a4  0;
at is the asset at the end of period t  1. For notation simplicity, we rewrite  = 11+ ; and
R = (1 + r):
It is obvious that the optimal choice for the individual at period 3 is to consume all he
has, thus
V3(a3; p) = log(Ra3 + p)
When t = 2; the value function is:
V2(a2; y2) = max
c2
flog(c2) + E2 [V3(a3; p)]g
subject to : c2 + a3 = Ra2 + y2
Maximization gives:
c2 =
R2a2 +Ry2 + p
(1 + )R
a3 =
(R2a2 +Ry2)  p
(1 + )R
V2(a2;y2) = (1 + ) log(R
2a2 +Ry2 + p) + (;R)
where (;R) =   log [(1 + )R] +  log (=(1 + )) :
Note that at the beginning of period 2, wage income y2 is realized so no income risk
remains. Therefore, the optimal solutions c2(a2; y2) and c3(a3; p) are of the same form for
the two cases: without and with income risk. The di¤erence occurs in the rst period.
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When t = 1; the value function is:
V1(y1) = max
c1
flog(c1) + E1 [V2(a2;y2)]g
subject to : c1 + a2 = y1
For illustration purpose, we assume that the second period wage income y2 can take
only two values fE[y2]  y; E[y2] + yg ( y  0 ) with equal probability 0.5. Denote the
corresponding pension benet at period 3 as fE[p]  p; E[p] + pg ( p  0 and p = 0 if
y = 0) respectively. For notation simplicity, we write 2 = (p + Ry)2: 2 measures the
size of the future income risk, including both labor income at period 2 and pension income
at period 3. Denote the present value of expected life time income as L; i.e.
L =
R2y1 +RE[y2] + E[p]
R2
:
With some simple but tedious calculations, we get
c1 =
L+B(E[p]; 2)]
(1 +  + 2)
; (1)
a2 = y1   c1; (2)
where
B(E[p]; 2) =
(1 + )
2
L 
s
(
(1 + )
2
)2L2 +
(2 +  + 1)
R2
2:
It is easy to show that B(E[p]; 2)  0, and equality holds if and only if 2 = 0.
When there is no uncertainty, we have y = 0; so 2 = 0 and B reduces to zero.
The optimal consumption at period 1 will simply be L=(1 +  + 2). In contrast, the
consumption under income risk is always smaller than the consumption without income risk,
since B(E[p]; 2) < 0 when 2 > 0. Thus, "prudent" individuals lower their consumption to
prepare for possible income fall in future. This pattern is labeled as "precautionary saving"
in the literature. Another useful observation is that the higher the uncertainty of income
is, the lower the consumption and the higher the savings are.
The e¤ect of the income risk on the o¤set e¤ect of pension wealth on private wealth is
not as straightforward. We see from equation (1) and (2) that the optimal savings at period
1, a2 depends on the expected pension wealth E[p]: Now suppose the agent gets information
that the pension will increase by E[p]. We look at the change of non-pension savings at
the end of period 1, a2. It follows from (1) and (2):
a2 =  c1 =
 1
(1 +  + 2)
(E[p]=R2 +B(E[p] + E[p]; 2)] B(E[p]; 2)]) (3)
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When there is no income risk, we havea2 =
 1
(1++2)
(E[p]=R2) < 0. So increased pension
wealth will induce a reduction in the nonpension wealth with magnitude
ja2j =
(E[p]=R2)
(1 +  + 2)
:
For the case when income risk is present, we note that given that E[p] is positive,
B(E[p]+E[p]; 2)]  B(E[p]; 2)] is strictly increasing w.r.t 2 and equal to 0 when 2 = 0.
Thus, the private wealth reduction ( ja2j) increases with future income risk 2 in this
simple setup. This implies that for the same pension wealth increase, the individuals facing
income risk actually o¤set more than those who face no income risk. They increase their
consumption more, since the increased pension income will not only reduce the savings for
retirement but also the "precautionary" saving due to the income uncertainty. However,
their consumption after the increase is still lower than the case when there is no income
uncertainty. This is consistent with the argument that "at a given wealth and income
level, the marginal propensity to consumption to consume out of wealth is higher under
uncertainty" (Zeldes, 1992). What we can see more is that the o¤set e¤ect increases with
the increase of the variance of the income risk in this simple model.
However, generalizations of above conclusions to more complicated income process, dif-
ferent preference setups, how would it work together with other factors such as mortality
risk are very di¢ cult since typically there is no close form solution for the optimal consump-
tion and savings. In what follows we will set up a simulation model to look at this problem
in more general settings.
3 The model
We set up a model that describes the savings behavior of married couples (households) over
the life cycle. A household has two members: a husband and a wife. They enter into labor
market at age 30 and work until age of 67. For simplicity, we assume that the husband and
the wife are at the same age, thus they will retire at the same year.
We allow both the husband and the wife to face an uncertain life span but can survive no
longer than 99. When one household member dies, the survivor remains in the household
gets all the asset and living alone afterwards. For simplicity, we rule out divorces or re-
marriages. We call a household is alive when there is at least one member alive. Thus,
a households life span is dened by the maximum of the two household membersage of
death.
We assume that markets are incomplete. There is no insurances available against earn-
ings and mortality risk. The household can only trade one-period risk-free bonds with real
interest rate r.
During the working years, each individual supplies one unit of labor and receive wage
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income yt at each period. Labor earnings can be decomposed into two part, the deterministic
part g(xt) and the random part vt. xt is a vector of individual characteristics. vt is a random
variable which represents productivity shock. Detailed information on the income evolving
process can be found below in section (4.1). In this paper, for computational simplicity,
it is assumed that only husbands income is random. After retirement, individuals receive
yearly pension income pt which is a function of income history fytgt=30;::;66: There is no
uncertainty on pension income level once the whole income path is realized.
3.1 Preference and the households problem
The periodic utility function for husband and wife is denoted as U(ct), where ct is the
household consumption. At period t, the husband and the wife solve for the consumption
level ct that maximizes the corresponding remaining life time utility:
max
fct0g
u(ct) + E
XT
i=t+1
i tu(ci): (4)
Where 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount factor. Despite the couples value the household
consumption exactly the same way, they will generally not agree on the consumption and
savings decisions when there is mortality risk. Typically, women want to save more than
men do since they have lower pension entitlements and expect to live longer. Following the
collective approach of household behavior, we model the households decision as an outcome
of a cooperative bargaining process. We assume that the households maximize a weighted
sum of the husbands and the wifes expected future utility with a bargaining parameter .
If  = 1, the household behaves as if the husband has exclusive decision-making control. In
this paper,  is assumed to be constant over time and is not a¤ected by the realization of
income risks. Similar settings can be found in Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (1997) and Domeij
and Klein (2002).
The household members are assumed to have the same constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) preference:
u(c) =
(c=)1    1
1   ;  > 0:
where  is the household equivalence scale which is dened as
p
N; where N is the number of
household members. 1= is the inter-temporal substitution elasticity between consumption
in any two periods, i.e., it measures the willingness to substitute consumption between
di¤erent periods. The smaller  (the larger 1=) the more willing is the household to
substitute consumption over time. One of the properties of the CRRA function is that
u000(c) > 0, implying a positive motive for precautionary saving. This feature is very useful
since we want to study the e¤ect of risks in the life cycle model.
If one member in the household dies, the surviving one will get the remaining asset. If
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the household dies, the remaining asset a is regarded as a bequest, which gives utility
ub(a) = 
a1    1
1   :
 measures the importance of bequest motive. When  = 0, there is no bequest motive.
The budget constraint (in the working period) is given by
c+ at+1 = Rat + y
m
t + y
f
t   T (at; ymt ; yft ; r);
at+1   at+1:
Where T is a tax function. There are taxes on both labor income and capital gain, but
not on wealth. The unit of tax calculation is household. We assume that the real interest
rate and the tax function are given exogenously. at+1 is the maximum amount that the
household can borrow at age t. We assume that a100 = 0; so no one can borrow at age 99,
since they will die with probability one next period. For all the other periods, we assume
that the borrowing limits are the same and equal to a:
4 Calibration and Solution method
4.1 Earnings Process
We assume that individuals earnings over time follow an exogenously given stochastic
process, which can be decomposed into a deterministic part and a random part. Denote yit
as the income which contributes to pensions for individual i of age t. We have:
~yit = ln(yit) = wit + vit (5)
where wit is the deterministic component of age-specic income which can be interpreted
as permanent income, attributable to age, education levels, age dummies and year dummies.
The component vit is the random component of an agents income.
There are several models in the literature available for the study of income dynamics
over time. Jia and Zhu (2009a) analyzes the dynamic structure of income of male adults
in Norway for the period 1992 to 2005, and found that an extended "prole heterogeneity
model" ts the data well. Here, we apply a simpler version of the model used there and
assume that vit has the structure:
vit = i + ieit + zit; (6)
where i; i are time-invariant individual specic e¤ects, which are obtained at the start
of working life. eit denotes the potential labor market experiences. zit is period specic
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Figure 1: Age income prole, high school graduates
earnings shock which is independent of i and i. We assume that zit is realized at the
beginning of each period over the life cycle. It follows AR(1) process:
zit = zit 1 + it (7)
 is the degree of persistence in the income shocks. Furthermore, we assume: i s i:i:d.
N(0; 2); i s i:i:d. N(0; 2); it s i:i:d. N(0; 2):
Based on the Norwegian registered income tax les covering the period 1992-2005, we
estimate the above model in two steps. In the rst step, we run a regression using equation
(5). We then proceed to estimate the covariance parameters using a Minimum Distance
Estimator on the predicted residuals.
Separated regressions are run for married male and females of age 30 to 66. Figure (1)
displays the estimated deterministic part of age-earnings proles for male and female with
high school education.
As we mentioned earlier, we will only look at the income risk for husbands for com-
putational simplicity. Income for wives are assumed to be exogenously given and equal to
the deterministic part of income regression. Table (1) reports the coe¢ cient estimates for
equation (6) and (7) for males. What we can see is that the individual specic unobserved
e¤ects 
i
and i account for the majority of the unexplained crosssection income variations.
We then approximate the AR(1) process by a ve-state Markov process using the method
by Tauchen (1985). Flodén (2008) examined the accuracy of methods used to approximate
AR(1) processes with discrete Markov chains and found this method behaves quite well.
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estimate t-value
var() 1.1411 84.0
var() 0.0014 81.8
cov(; ) -0.0373 -78.3
 0.4363 123.2
var() 0.1021 215.3
Table 1: Estimates of the AR(1) income process, Norwegian adult males0BBBB@
0:1307 0:6164 0:2459 0:0071 0:0000
0:0285 0:4259 0:4985 0:0468 0:0003
0:0037 0:1820 0:6288 0:1820 0:0037
0:0003 0:0468 0:4985 0:4259 0:0285
0:0000 0:0071 0:2459 0:6164 0:1307
1CCCCA
Table 2: Probability Transition Matrix for the AR(1) Approximation
The approximation process is characterized by a vector of support points:
z = f 1:142; 0:571; 0:000; 0:571; 1:142g;
and a probability transition matrix given in Table (2).
4.2 The public pension scheme
In the calibration and main simulations, we use a somewhat stylized version of the Norwegian
old age pension scheme provided by the National Insurance System. It is a dened benet
system and has two components: a basic amount and an earnings related component. See
for example, Jia (2005) for a more detailed description of the Norwegian pension system.
Other types of pensions, such as occupational pensions are ignored in this study.
The pension income can be seen as a function of the working-life accumulated income.
The relationship between average life time earnings and pension income is illustrated in
Figure (2).
4.3 Surviving probability
The households enter the economy at age 30, retire at age 67 and are dead by age 100. The
survival probabilities for each household member depend on age and sex, and are taken from
the life tables in 2004 from Statistics Norway. For the case without life-time uncertainty,
we assume both members of households die at age 80, which is approximately the average
life expectancy in Norway.
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Variables Calibrated Value
subject discount factor  0.9512
borrowing constraints a -220,000 NOK
parameter for bequest  3.2
Table 3: Calibration Result
4.4 Preference and life cycle-parameters
Preference and life cycle parameters are important to our simulation results. However, a
full estimation of the model is numerically di¢ cult. Thus, we choose a simpler method,
where we set the values for some parameters and calibrate the rest. We set the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion  to 2, which is used in many studies in the literature, see for example,
Domeij and Klein (2002). The risk free rate of return is set to 4%, close to an average real
interest rate in Norway over past 30 years. The bargaining power parameter is set to 0.5.
The parameters remain to be determined are: the subjective discount factor ; the
preference parameter represents the bequest motive,  and the borrowing limit a
¯
. Based
on the Norwegian household data from 1992 to 2005, we calibrate the model using three
statistics: the ratio of average wealth to average income among 30 to 66-year-old households;
the ratio of working households with positive wealth; and the average bequests. The
observed value for these three statistics are 1.915, 0.81, 525,000 NOK2 respectively.
The calibration results are given in Table (3).
21 Euro is approximately 7.8 NOK in 2005.
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State variables properties
Age t Deterministic(Exogenous)
Income shock to husband zh Income process(Exogenous)
Accumulated pension claim, husband APC Exogenous(updating through income)
Household mortality status S Endogenous
Asset a Endogenous
Control variable
Consumption c
Table 4: State variables and control variable
4.5 Numerical solution to the householdsproblem
As the period utility function is CRRA, the analytical solution for the maximization problem
(4) does not exist. We solve this problem by numerical methods.
The state variables are summarized in Table 4. In order to numerically solve this prob-
lem, some discretizations are needed for the continuous state variables.
We have already discretized the income shocks, z. The pension claim after retirement
is simplied a bit such that it is related only to the average income over the working years.
We use a simple variable to keep track of the shock history over the years. For age t ; we
dene a variable APC as the ratio of average realized income to the average deterministic
income:
APCit =
Xt
s=1
exp(yis)Xt
s=1
exp(wis)
;
with updating rule:
APCit+1 = (APCit 
Xt
s=1
exp(wis) + yit+1)=
Xt+1
s=1
exp(wis):
We then discretize it equally by 100 grid points within the range [exp( 1:15); exp(1:15)]3.
We use 200 equally spaced grid points for asset. The range of the wealth at the end of
each period is set to be [a
¯
; 6; 000; 000], where a
¯
is the borrowing limit for the household.
To solve the problem e¢ ciently, we use the method of endogenous grid points proposed
by Carroll (2006). To do this, we introduce a variable t which Carroll (2006) called "cash on
hand" in period t. The idea is to generate the optimal pair (t; ct) given other state variables
value while the grid on t is not predetermined but endogenously generated from the end
of period asset at+1. This greatly decreases the computational burden since "expectations
are never computed for any grid-point not used in the nal interpolating function" (Carroll
(2006), p315). The detailed backward induction setup is given in Appendix A.
3The boundaries is derived from the AR(1) approximation results.
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5 The o¤set e¤ect
The main purpose of this study is to look at to what extent the pension wealth reduces
savings when we extend the basic life cycle consumption models to allow for di¤erent risks,
imperfect credit market and bequest motivations. During the working life, the backward
induction solution for the optimal private wealth gives the relationship between the present
value of cash wages earned up to date, the present value of expected lifetime earnings, and
the present value of future pension benets. That is, we can write wealth as a function of
present value of expected pension wealth Epti and other state variables X
t
i :
at+1i = f(X
t
i ; Ep
t
i):
Under the complete market life cycle model, this function is linear and o¤set e¤ects can be
dened straightforwardly as the parameter in front of the expected pension wealth Epti and
it is equal to the partial derivative @at+1i =@Ep
t
i. In the case of the extended models, this is
no longer true. The standard practice is to estimate a linear approximation of this function.
However, the specication of this linear approximation plays very important roles and there
is no consensus in the literature. Fortunately, we can simulate partial derivative @at+1i =@Ep
t
i
easily here. We only need to obtain the optimal consumption policy functions at each age
under two di¤erent pension systems where one is simply a small uniform shift of the other,
and apply a simple nite di¤erence approximation to calculate the derivatives.
In the literature, the term "perfect o¤set" is linked to the prediction from the simplest
life cycle model where people save solely to smooth the consumption, since in this model
consumption in each period depends only on the present value of total income (wages and
pensions), but not on the allocation of compensation between them. Typically, it is under-
stood as the situation in which there is a dollar-for-dollar reduction in accumulated private
savings with accumulated pension wealth. It is thus desirable to have a denition of o¤set
that gives a value of -1 in this case to be consistent with other studies in the literature.
If we simply use the the partial derivative @at+1i =@Ep
t
i, the o¤set e¤ect for the analytical
example given in section 2 when 2 = 0 is equal to
 1
(1 +  + 2)
;
which is not  1. This "bias" has been pointed out by Gale (1998) and he suggested to
adjust the parameter by a factor 1=Q(t) when time is continuous. In the case where time is
discrete, it can be shown that
Q(t) =
Pt
s=1(1 + r)
t s+s=s=

=
PT
i=1 
i=(1 + r)i= i

: (8)
16
Detailed calculation can be found in Appendix B4. In our analytical example, we have  = 1;
T = 3 and t = 1; using (8) we have
Q(1) = 1=(1 +  + 2):
Appling this factor to the estimated partial derivative will correctly give us the perfect o¤set
" 1".
In the light of above discussion, in the rest of this paper, we use the following o¤set
parameter denition:
 =
@at+1i
@Epi
Q(t) 1 (9)
Note that although it is a little counter-intuitive, it is absolutely possible for  to be
smaller than  1. Recall that in the analytical example when there is income risk, the
reduction is actually bigger than the situation when there is no income risk, which leads
to a  smaller than  1. On the other hand, a positive  is also possible. Positive o¤set
implies that increased pension wealth actually increases other savings, which can be a result
of so called "the induced retirement e¤ect". So although we typically nd estimated o¤set
between  1 and 0 in the literature, the true value domain has no such restriction.
5.1 Simulation Results
We run several simulations to look at the consequences of including the income risk, mortal-
ity risk, borrowing constraints and bequest motive in the complete market life cycle model.
The "bias" corrected o¤set parameter over life cycle is calculated for each case. We try to
shed some lights on the roles of each component.
In theory, bequest motive will increase the private savings since it is similar to the case
where the planning horizon is increased but there is zero income for the extended periods.
The bequest motive will dampen the o¤set e¤ect simply because the increased pension
wealth has to be distributed to the bequest as well.
The e¤ect of borrowing constraint on savings and the o¤set parameter is relatively
straightforward as well. When households are subject to a specic borrowing constraints,
they are not able to increase their debts, although it is optimal for them to do so. In
this case, we will observe no o¤set at all. Figure (3) shows the estimated o¤sets over the
working life for three di¤erent cases of credit rationing, 220; 000 NOK, 500; 000 NOK and
4This adjustment parameter is attained under the assumption that the pension wealth increase is recog-
nized before the working life starts. Some may consider this assumption somewhat restrictive. However,
similar adjust factors can be calculated under the assumption that the pension wealth increase is recognized
at any age t during the working life. Under the standard life cycle model, as long as we keep the adjust
factor and the simulation of the partial derivatives @at+1i =@Ep
t
i consistent, the value of  will always give -1.
Under the extended model, the results may di¤er. However, this is no right or wrong using either of these
two methods. We stick to the rst one since we want to compare the results we get to those in Hernæs and
Zhu (2007).
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Figure 3: O¤set e¤ects: Di¤erent borrowing limits.
no limit, when the basic model is extended only with borrowing constraint. It shows that
the borrowing constraint have a quite strong e¤ect on the o¤set estimates. As we expected,
the tighter the constraint is, the lower the o¤set.
Now we look at income risk. Figure (4) shows a single simulation of savings for a
household with high school education when there is only income risk. The savings prole
over the working life exhibits the so called "hump shape". The household borrows in the
early years of working life, then saving starts to rise and reaches its peak around end of
50s. The saving uctuates over the working life with household income, while consumption
is relatively stable over the time. These features of life cycle model with stochastic income
have been well-known in the literature. Figure (5) shows the average o¤set e¤ect estimate
of 10, 000 simulations. We see that the o¤set parameter is slightly lower than -1 (the perfect
o¤set case) for all the working period. This is consistent to what is shown in the analytical
example. Income risk tends to increase the o¤set e¤ect of pension wealth on private savings,
even with a di¤erent preference and much more complicated income process. It increases
towards -1 as the household gets older and income risks over the life are realized. Another
conjecture we had when we discuss the analytical example is that the higher the volatility
of the income risk is, the lower the o¤set will be. To test this idea, we double the variance
of the AR(1) error term·s zit = zit+ it. Simulation result is presented in Figure (5) as well.
It conrms our conjecture.
However, the estimated o¤set in this case is very close to -1, which suggests that income
risk does not seem to inuence the o¤set behavior much given our estimated income risk.
It can be argued that our estimated income risk is far too small, which leads to the small
e¤ect on o¤set. However, according to our estimated income process, there is around 18%
chance that the wage income will decrease by 45% in next period. This risk is certaintly
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le with only income risk, a single simulation
not small.
Now we look at the inuence of mortality risk. Note that we assume that there is
no insurance available. It is not possible for any single individual household to borrow.
However, when both members of household are alive, mortality risk does not automatically
imply non-negative restriction on asset,since we have assumed that at most one member can
die at any given year (other than 100). There are three e¤ects which work on the di¤erent
direction on savings. Firstly, when mortality risk is introduced, households have a longer
planning horizon which has also longer period with lower income (years after retirement),
so it may be desirable to save more. Secondly, as mentioned above, mortality risk prevents
single household to borrow. This also will increase savings. Thirdly, the introduction
of mortality risk gives lower discount factor (the discount factor times the probability of
surviving), which tends to lower the savings. Figure (6) shows the age-savings proles for
household whose members are both alive at 66, when there is only mortality risk present.
It shows that given our chosen parameters, the rst two e¤ects dominate over the whole
working life.
Including the mortality risk lowers the o¤set considerably compared with the prediction
from the complete market life cycle model. See Figure (7). In the same gure, the average
o¤set e¤ect prole under the full extended model is also presented. That is the case where
all the four factors are considered. The o¤set e¤ect is nearly zero at the start of working
life. It increases as age increases. The average o¤set for age 45-50 is found to be around
45%.
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Figure 5: O¤set E¤ect: di¤erent income risk.
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Age
N
O
K
, 1
00
0
Household Income Saving_certainty Saving_mortality risk
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le, with and without mortality risk.
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5.2 Further discussions
In this section, we discuss other issues which may inuence the results, such as the bargaining
power within the household, other pension schemes, and the size of the income risk etc.
5.2.1 Bargaining Power within the household
In the above simulations, we have assumed that the household members have equal saying
on household consumption and savings decisions over the life cycle. As mentioned earlier,
women live longer and have lower income and pensions. Compared with men, they have
extra incentives to save more. Therefore, the choice of bargaining power parameter will
inuence the savings behavior as well as the o¤set parameters over the life cycle. Figure (8)
depicts savings behavior over the working life for two values of bargaining power parameter:
husband has lower bargaining power,  = 0:2, the same power as the wife,  = 0:5. As we
expected, the households saving increases as the husbands bargaining power declines. The
di¤erences of the accumulated wealth around 60 years old between equal weight households
( = 0:5)and wife dominated households ( = 0:2) is around 200, 000 NOK. With regards
to the o¤set parameter, wife dominated households are less willing to substitute private
wealth with increased pension wealth. The di¤erences are sizable (Figure (9)).
5.2.2 A lump-sum pension system
While preferences and saving motives are important to answer the question how a pension
system a¤ects savings behavior, the pension systems own design is also crucial. The current
Norwegian pension system is essentially a dened benet, earnings related system. Here,
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Figure 10: O¤set e¤ects under two di¤erent pension schemes.
we consider a lump-sum pension system where benets do not depend on past earnings. A
similar pension system is also discussed by Domeij and Klein (2002). The benet level is
set at a value which is just enough to cover the basic living needs, i.e. one basic amount
(56,000 NOK in 2003). In short, this pension system serves mainly as income security for
the elderly.
Figure (10) shows the o¤set estimates under these two pension schemes. Households are
more willing to substitute private wealth with pension wealth under the lump-sum pension
system. One explanation is that when pension income doesnt depend on past earnings,
there is actually less risks facing the households. So their behaviors are more similar to the
case that the complete market life cycle model predicts.
5.2.3 Rich households and poor households.
An important empirical pattern found both in Hernæs and Zhu (2007) and Jia and Zhu
(2009b), among other empirical studies on o¤set e¤ects, is that rich households typically
are more willing to substitute private wealth with pension wealth. It leads to a higher
absolute value of the estimated o¤set parameter for the richer. In the complete market life
cycle model, this will not happen. No matter rich or poor, the o¤set will be always -1. Many
explanations are proposed to explain this pattern. For example, some argue that compared
with rich households, low income households may have limited liquidity and face more
credit rationing, which makes the o¤set much smaller. Others note the correlation between
earnings and education. They argue that higher educated households are more knowledgable
on nancial planning, pension rules etc, which leads to behaviors more similar to a life cycle
model predicts.
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Figure 11: Income trends: rich, middle and poor household
In our simulations below, we simply construct three di¤erent income trends: high, middle
and low. The stochastic part of the income process is the same AR(1) presented in section
(4.1). All households face the same credit constraints and have the same discounting factor.
The income trends are plotted in Figure (11) and the o¤set estimates are presented in Figure
(12). The simulation results show a clear pattern: higher income households o¤set more.
This suggests that although the explanations listed above are possible and reasonable, the
di¤erences on the o¤set e¤ects between rich and poor households can be generated without
these factors present.
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Figure 12: O¤set parameters: Rich and Poor Households
We also have done some sensitivity tests on rate of return r, the inter-temporal substi-
tution elasticity . The quantities of the simulated o¤sets change with these parameters.
But the main picture remains.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze an extended model of life cycle savings decision. It adds income
risk, mortality risk, borrowing constraints and bequest motivation to the complete market
life cycle model. The model is then used to investigate how these factors inuence the sub-
stitution between private and pension wealth over the working years. The simulation results
suggest that when households are under inuences of these above mentioned factors, they
tend to reduce less private savings with the same pension wealth change, compared with the
case when they are not. The average o¤set for age 45-50 is found to be around 45%, which is
still somewhat higher than Hernæs and Zhu (2007) and Jia and Zhu (2009b) found in their
studies. However, our result shows that by simply accounting these risks and constraints,
we can explain most of the departure between empirical ndings and theoretical prediction.
It seems that borrowing constraints and mortality risk plays more important roles. The in-
teraction between the di¤erent factors discussed in this paper are quite complicated. Once
either mortality risk or borrowing constraints are taken into account, adding in the other
factors will not change the o¤set e¤ect much. Back to the policy question raised earlier in
this paper, this seems to imply that popular policy proposals such as removing the capital
market imperfection or increasing job market security will not contribute much to increase
the responses to pension reforms.
25
This study also shows that there may be considerable di¤erences on the behavior re-
sponses to pension wealth shift even when there is no di¤erence on "taste" of savings. The
o¤set e¤ects depend on many factors, such as life time expected labor earnings, bargaining
power within the household and income shock volatilities. Since these factors are often
unobserved to econometricians, how to resolve these issues in the empirical investigations
of the relationship between private savings and public pension wealth remains a di¢ cult
challenge.
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Appendix A: Backward Induction
We illustrate the backward induction here by exploiting the case with certain life span for
a single individual.
The backward induction starts at the end of life span H. P is the pension income,
which is xed for given income history. However, we will still treat it as a state variable for
illustration purpose.
At period H; the value function is dened as:
WH(AH ; P ) = max
c
fu(c) + Ub(AH+1)g; (10)
s.t.c+ AH+1 = (1 + r)AH + P = mH :
where mH is the cash on hand at time H:
We start with a set of grid points for AH+1: We solve out the optimal consumption for
each grid point of AH+1; using the rst order condition:
u0(cH) = Ub(AH+1):
Based on the pair fAH+1; cHg; and make use of the relationship
mH + c
 = AH+1:
We can generate the grid for cash on hand mH and the optimal consumption c(mH) on
those grid points. The value function VH(mH ; P ) 5follows immediately.
At period t = H   1;
W (At; P ) = max
ct
fu(ct) + Wt+1(AH ; P )g (11)
s.t.c+ At = (1 + r)At 1 + P = mt
First order condition gives us:
u0(ct ) = 
@Wt+1
@At+1
jAt+1=(1+r)At ct (12)
= (1 + r)
@Vt+1
@mt+1
jmt+1=(1+r)At+1+P
5We have the relationship VH(mH ; P ) = VH((1 + r)AH + P ) =WH(AH ; P )
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Note that, we can rewrite the optimization problem as the following:
Vt(mt; P ) = max
At+1
fu(mt   At+1) + Wt+1(At+1; P )g
This implies that (the envelope theorem)
@Vt(mt)
@mt
= u0(mt   At+1) = u0(ct (mt)) (13)
Then we can have the relationship
u0(ct ) = (1 + r)
@Vt+1(mt+1; P )
@mt+1
= (1 + r)u0(ct+1(mt+1)) (14)
For any given value of next period asset At+1, the cash on hand mt+1 is generated. Since
ct+1(mt+1) is already known, we can calculate c

t using (14). Applying again the cash on
hand denition:
mt + c

t = At+1:
we now have the optimal consumption ct (mt) at a grid offmtg:
When there is mortality risk and income risk, (14) becomes
u0(ct ) = (1 + r)E(
@Vt+1(mt+1; P )
@mt+1
) = (1 + r)E(u0(ct+1(mt+1))) (15)
The main idea is exactly the same.
Appendix B: Bias correction parameter.
The Euler equation at year t can be written as:
u0 (ct) = [R]u0 (ct+1)
i:e:
c t = Rc
 
t+1
we have:
ct+1 = R
1=ct (16)
From age t to the end of life, the budget constraints will be:
TX
j=t
1
Rj t
cj = Rat +
R 1X
j=t
1
Rj t
yj +
TX
j=R
1
Rj t
pj
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use (16), it can be rewrite as:
ct  (
TX
j=t
1
Rj t
[R]
j t
   1) = at+1 +
R 1X
j=t+1
1
Rj t
yj +
TX
j=R
1
Rj t
pj
Dene pt =
TP
j=R
Rt jpj; which is the accumulated pension wealth evaluated at age t; we
have:
@at+1
@pt
=
"
@ct
@pt
(
TX
j=t
1
Rj t
[R]
j t
   1)  1
#
(17)
The period consumption can be written as:
ct =
" 
R 1X
j=1
R jyj
!
+
 
TX
j=R
R jpj
!#
[R]t= =
TX
j=1
Rj= jj= (18)
which is:
ct = Y + p
tt (19)
where t is: t = R
 t [R]j= =
TP
j=1
Rj= jj=:
Dene !t =
TP
j=t
1
Rj t [R]
j t
 ; use (19), (17) becomes:
@at
@pt
= [t(!t   1)  1] (20)
=  
Pt
j=1R
j= jj=

=
PT
j=1 
j=Rj= j

: (21)
Thus
Q(t) =
Pt
j=1R
j= jj=

=
PT
j=1 
j=Rj= j

:
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